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Abstract: Empirical evidence is provided to show that peer effects have statistically significant and
positive impacts on the diffusion of green building certificates. Application and approval records of
green certificates by commercial buildings in NY and AZ are used. The challenge of self-selection is
addressed by the usage of fixed effects and the challenge of reflection is addressed by the time lag
delay between a building’s application and its approval. Empirical results show that an additional
approved LEED certificate within a zip code will increase the probability of a commercial building in
the same zip code to apply for a LEED certificate by 3–4 percentage points; an additional approved
Energy Star certificate within a zip code will increase the probability of a commercial building in the
same zip code to apply for an Energy Star certificate by 1–2 percentage points.
Keywords: peer effects; voluntary green building certificates; technology diffusion
1. Introduction
Voluntary green building certification systems have become increasingly popular among
commercial buildings over the last decade. Such trends should be welcomed because it encourages
sustainable and energy-efficient design to minimize commercial buildings’ environmental footprints.
In the U.S., the two main voluntary green certification programs for commercial buildings are the
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) program developed by the non-governmental
private organization U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC), and the Energy Star program sponsored
by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Department of Energy.
Beginning with its launch in 2000, the LEED system has become the flagship for green buildings
with its rating systems spanning many aspects throughout the development and construction process.
Through 2012, more than 13,500 commercial-building projects are LEED-certified in the U.S. The rating
systems cover five environmental categories including sustainable sites, water efficiency, energy and
atmosphere, materials and resources, and indoor environmental quality. In 2009, USGBC proposed
a new LEED rating system called LEED2009. LEED2009 imposes a prerequisite to water efficiency
and buildings that apply for the certificates must meet a maximum water usage threshold. Another
important change with LEED2009 is the introduction of a new credit weighting system with an increase
emphasis on the reductions of energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. The third change
is adding innovation in design and regional priority credits, which awards additional points on
sustainable building expertise and specific regional environmental design [1].
The other green certification program, Energy Star, was created in 1992. Over 50 different product
categories, as well as homes, commercial buildings, and industrial plants, can be certified by this program
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with a blue Energy Star label. To be eligible for Energy Star certification, a building must perform as the
top 25 percent of energy-efficient buildings in the nation. In 2012, the Energy Star program successfully
saved energy costs for businesses and consumers of about $24 billion across the U.S [2].
Green certification is an indicator of the original design of a building’s quality in terms of
sustainability. Environmental sustainability involves lower environmental footprint and reduction of
carbon emissions. The design of buildings that can meet the LEED and Energy Star requirements is
intended to enhance environmental sustainability and, thus, generate positive externalities. Such green
building certification is a governmental and commercial instrument in favor of the diffusion of positive
externalities. Although behavior response of commercial building occupants might offset some
energy conservation from energy efficient technologies through “rebound effects” [3,4], green certified
buildings have received more attention as the awareness of energy efficiency and the established
“green” premia on building rents and market values have strengthened [5]. Hence, understanding the
factors influencing the diffusion of voluntary green building certificates is of critical interest to both
marketers and policy makers.
Firms might choose to go green for several reasons. First, the falling relative price of renewable
energy to traditional energy is starting to offer firms another way to cut costs [6]. Second, going green
allows firms to enjoy an energy efficiency gain even when going green does not necessarily cut energy
expenses [7]. Third, there is evidence that a company’s decision to go green is rewarded by the markets
through increasing property values and rent prices [8].
Peer effects—defined as the phenomenon that members of a peer group with similar characteristics
and social status tend to influence each other’s decisions—are considered as an important factor in the
diffusion of new technologies or programs. There is evidence that peer effects can influence various
corporate activities, such as executive compensation and product development [9]. Peer effects can
influence firm actions through various mechanisms such as changes in corporate conditions through
competition, information spillover, pooling of resources, and preference changes. This paper estimates,
empirically, the peer effects of commercial buildings’ adoption of green certificates. The diffusion
of green certification is also in line with the concept of diffusion of innovation by Rogers [10].
According to Rogers [10], new ideas or innovation can spread through communication among the
members of a social group. In the context of this paper, the innovation is green building certification.
The diffusion channel we analyze is peer effects, which involves communication among building
owners or developers who work in areas geographically close to each other.
There has been a rich body of literature examining peer effects based on household or individual
choices. However, empirical research estimating peer effects among firms has been sparse. Devenow
and Welch [11] show that financial firms’ decisions are influenced by those of other financial firms
via information acquisition, informational learning, and/or reputation signals based on managers’
desires. Patnam [12] provides evidence that peer effects have significant influence on investment
strategies and executive compensations of firms. Leary and Roberts [9] show that firms’ financing
decisions are heavily influenced by peers’ financing decisions and not so much determined by changes
in firm-specific characteristics. They also find that the types of firms that are most influenced by peers
are smaller firms with less experienced CEOs and financial constraints.
As will be discussed in Section 3, empirically estimating peer effects has many challenges.
This paper builds upon the empirical model in Bollinger and Gillingham [13] to consistently measure
the peer effects in commercial buildings’ adoption of green certificates. In particular, peer effects on
the diffusion of green certification in New York (NY) and Arizona (AZ) are detected by using a unique
panel dataset of commercial buildings from ProspectNow [14] and certificate-application-and-approval
information from LEED and Energy Star programs. Moreover, the magnitudes of peer effects before
and after the revision of LEED rating system in 2009 are compared and peer effects decreased in
magnitude after 2009. There have been studies examining peer effects in the adoption of green
technologies such as solar panels and energy efficient vehicles by households [13,15,16]. This paper
adds to the existing literature by providing empirical evidence that peer effects are also present in
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the adoption of green certificates of commercial buildings. This paper analyzes both retrofits and
new construction. Our results have important implications for policymakers and the green-building
industry via two dimensions: (1) diffusion can be facilitated by establishing early adopters of green
certificates or green building demonstration projects; and (2) diffusion can also be encouraged by
creating platforms for interactions among building managers or corporate environmental staffs.
The paper proceeds as follows. After the introduction, Section 2 discusses current empirical
challenges in peer-effects estimation, presents our empirical strategy, describes the data used and
provides summary statistics. Section 3 presents the econometric results. Section 4 performs robustness
checks. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Empirical Challenges to Estimate Peer Effects
There are different ways of identifying peer effects in the existing literature: the structural model
approach established by Manski [17], experiments where assignment of peers is random [18–20],
and other models leveraging network structures, non-linearity, and lagged variables [21–23].
A commonly-cited approach to estimate peer effects uses observational data and regresses an agent’s
own outcome on peer outcomes, which is called the linear-in-means model. The model can be
described as:
yit “ α ` βEpy|xi, tq ` γ1Epz|xi, tq ` η1zit ` uit (1)
where yit is the outcome of agent i at time t; E(y|xi, t) is the average outcome of the peer group; x are
characteristics of the agent’s peer group; z are observable individual attributes; and u are unobservable
individual attributes.
As elaborated in Manski [17], Brock and Durlaf [24], Moffitt [21], Soetevent [25], and Bollinger
and Gillingham [13], two major problems of this approach make it difficult to identify causal peer
effects: self-selection and reflection. Self-selection is the problem that individual agents generally opt
into groups with members of similar characteristics/preferences, leading to an apparent existence of
peer effects. As a result, it will appear that peers’ outcomes cause the agent’s outcome but the actual
causality is the opposite. Reflection is the simultaneity problem where if peers influence an agent, the
agent’s action also influences them. Thus, an agent’s decision is not really influenced by peer effects in
the strict sense, but instead a reflection of what he/she might have already decided even in the absence
of a peer group. An example would be one building’s decision-maker has decided to obtain green
certification and explained her rationale to her peers. Some of her peers then become green-certified
around the same time. In this case, it might appear that her decision is influenced by her peers but,
in fact, even without these peers, she would also obtain green certification. This reflection problem can
contribute to the endogeneity issue.
In the context of applying for green building certificates, the potential identification problems
are as follows. First, it is relatively safe to assume that buildings in the same neighborhood probably
face similar institutional environments, environmental policies, and other characteristics, such as
capital level and ability of building management. These factors are likely to influence buildings’
decisions regarding green certification. If these factors are not observable and measurable, they
are then embodied in peer buildings’ actions and, hence, bias the estimates of peer effects. Second,
one individual building’s decision to apply for green certification can influence its neighboring
buildings’ decisions to apply for green certificates, thus making peer effects un-identifiable.
To address the self-selection problem, one can conduct an experiment where assignment of peers is
random [18–20]. However, conducting randomized experiment is not always feasible. In the absence of
experimental data, one common approach is to utilize panel data and include fixed effects to eliminate
unobservable characteristics that might generate self-selection [16,26], as shown in Equation (1).
As explained in more details in [13], “if peer group fixed effects ξi can control for group-specific
characteristics and if self-selection is the only issue, then β can be consistently estimated”.
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yit “ α ` βEpy|xi, tq ` γ1Epz|xi, tq ` η1zit ` ξi ` σt ` uit (2)
where ξi is the peer group effects and σt is the time fixed effects.
To address the reflection problem, several studies find instruments for an agent’s peers’ outcomes.
For example, the outcomes of peers’ parents or other relatives can influence peers’ outcomes and are
not related to the agent’s own outcome [27]. Another common strategy to solve for the reflection
problem, as shown in Equation (3), is to use the peers’ lagged outcomes to replace peers’ current
outcomes E(y|xi, t) [9,13,28,29]. In Equation (2), the coefficient β for the peers’ lagged outcome is
the peer effects. To do this in the context of technology diffusion, “installed base” of the technology
adopted in the peer group by year t ´ 1 is used as peers’ lagged outcome. The installed base is the
total number or size of the technologies adopted in the peer group. Using the installed base to explain
diffusion of a product or technology has been common in the literature [16,26,30–36].
yit “ α ` βEpy|xi, t´ 1q ` γ1Epz|xi, t´ 1q ` η1zit ` ξi ` σt ` uit (3)
2.2. Econometric Models
Following Bollinger and Gillingham [13], we utilize the fact that there is a time lag between the
application for a green certificate and the actual timing for being certified. Based on the records of
existing green buildings, on average, there is a one-to-three-years lag between the application and
the actual certification due to the time needed for application preparation and submission, extensive
review by experts, construction, and approval process. We assume that the peer effects of green
certification would not have an impact until the certificates are approved and granted by relevant
agencies. This is a reasonable assumption because only after a building is officially certified can people
see the sign of LEED or Energy Star certification on the building and the building can enjoy any
market-driven benefits associated with green buildings, such as higher rental prices. This time lag
can help solve the reflection problem because the application of a building in year t would not have
influenced the approval of peers’ certificates by year t whose applications were started at least more
than a year ago. To solve for the self-selection problem, we have included both time and peer group
fixed effects. We adopt the installed base model similar to the one in Equation (3).
Our analysis is at the zip code level. In our primary model, we estimate how peer effects influence
the probability that a commercial building in zip code z adopts green certificates:
Yzt “ α ` βbzt ` γ1Xzt ` hz ` xt ` ezt (4)
where Yzt is the share of commercial buildings in a zip code that were previously non-green buildings
and applied for a green certificate in year t, including both retrofits or new construction (Yzt = nzt /Nzt.
Here nzt is the number of green certification applications in zip code z in year t, meaning the number
of commercial buildings that were previously non-green and applied for green certification in year t.
Nzt is the total number of commercial buildings in zip code z in year t); bzt is the sum of green-certified
buildings in year t (bzt is the sum of green certified buildings across the years. This is a standard
approach in technology diffusion literature to calculate the installed base of technology [13,30]. We do
not just use the sum of green buildings in each year because the green buildings in previous years
can also impact the decisions of commercial buildings in current year); Xzt is a vector of explanatory
variables including mean year built, average assessed value per square foot, average square footage
of commercial buildings and the number of business establishments in each zip code; hz are zip code
fixed effects; xt are year fixed effects; ezt is a mean-zero stochastic error. We estimate the model in
Equation (4) in different approaches as shown below, including first differences model (FD) and
first differences model with mean-differenced zip code fixed effects (FD_MD). We then modified
Equation (4) to incorporate a change in the LEED rating system in 2009.
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First differences model: Aaccording to Narayanan and Nair [37], the traditional mean differenced
fixed effects model is biased in dynamic panel models. Following Bollinger and Gillingham [13], we use
the first differences model to estimate Equation (4) consistently. The first-differences specification is:
Yzt´Yzt–1 “ βpbzt´ bzt–1q ` γ1pXzt´Xzt–1q ` pxt´ xt–1q ` pezt´ ezt–1q (5)
First differences model with mean-differenced zip code fixed effects: zip code-level factors
that are time variant, such as zip code-level zoning regulations, can influence the installed base of
green-certified buildings. To control for such localized time trends, we run the regression on the
first-differences data (Equation (5)) with the inclusion of mean-differenced zip code fixed effects.
This is analogous to including zip code time trends.
Model testing change of LEED rating system in 2009: as discussed in Section 1, there were
significant changes in LEED rating system in 2009 which brought a prerequisite for water efficiency
for the first time, and put more emphasis on energy efficiency and reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, as well as the addition of innovation in design and regional priority credits. There could be
two opposite effects of the higher requirements in LEED 2009 rating system on the magnitudes of peer
effects. On one hand, the premium enjoyed by LEED certificates obtained after 2009 could be higher
because tenants might be aware that these green buildings are more environmentally friendly than
LEED buildings certified prior to 2009. As a result, as non-green buildings learn about this fact from
their peers, they might be more willing to apply for LEED certificates after 2009, so we might see an
increase in peer effects after 2009. On the other hand, peer effects could have been mitigated because
information about higher cost and difficulty in obtaining LEED certificates could deter non-green
buildings from applying. It boils down to the comparison of the change in the gap between marginal
benefit and marginal cost prior to and post 2009.
In order to compare the magnitudes of peer effects before and after the revision of LEED rating
system in 2009, we generate a dummy variable indicating whether it was before or after year 2009.
We modify Equation (4) by adding an interaction term that multiplies 2009 dummy by the sum of
green buildings in year t. To be specific, we estimate:
Yzt “ α ` βbzt ` γ1Xzt ` θbztˆYear2009t ` hz ` xt ` ezt (6)
where bzt ˆ Year2009t is the interaction term and Year2009t is the dummy variable indicating before or
after 2009. We expect β to be positive if there are peer effects and θ to be negative if the 2009 change in
LEED program makes it harder to apply for LEED certificates.
2.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The main dataset used in this paper is compiled from three sources: a general commercial building
stock collected from ProspectNow.com, Energy Star database from the Energy Star program, and
LEED database from USGBC. ProspectNow is a commercial real estate data provider which offers
detailed information of approximately six million commercial properties, including address, year
built, square footage, total assessed value, and property type. According to property type, buildings
are categorized as “commercial general”, “commercial office”, “store/office”, “department store”,
“whole sale outlet”, “parking lot”, and “hotel/motel”. Given that ProspectNow is a commercial data
provider, we obtain its data by purchasing it. The data from the other two sources are publicly available.
We rely on PropsectNow for two types of information: assessed property value and basic descriptive
characteristics of the properties. The descriptive characteristics are publicly available information that
can also be found from county records. For the assessed property value, which is an estimate and
outside of our areas of expertise, our data-provider selection criteria are comprehensive of coverage and
number of users by assuming that market forces will increase the users of the most reliable provider.
Most existing studies on green commercial buildings are focused on office buildings only. In this paper,
however, we analyze all commercial buildings rather than only commercial office buildings.
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From the ProspectNow.com database, we calculate average assessed commercial building property
value which is the assessed property value per square footage. This variable represents the expected
future property values and potential economic gains from the property. The lack of information on
energy cost savings and business revenue of commercial buildings makes it challenging to predict
the benefits from getting green certificates, and therefore we use the assessed property value per
square foot as a proxy for potential economic gain from green certificates. We also use the average
square footage per building and average year built from the ProspectNow.com database as explanatory
variables in order to examine whether building size and age make an impact on decisions of applying
for green building certificates.
The Energy Star program has been long established for certification of energy-efficient appliances.
In 1999, it was extended to commercial buildings. Starting in 2000, LEED has grown into a
comprehensive rating system specifically for buildings and constructions, covering many aspects of
design, operation, and construction. Energy Star and LEED databases are obtained from the Energy
Star program and U.S. Green Building Council, respectively. The two datasets contain information
of each green commercial building, including address, years of certification, and rating systems.
Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS), we match green-certified commercial buildings with the
general commercial building stock from ProspectNow by building address.
This study collects information on local economic activities which could also influence buildings’
certification decisions. For example, commercial buildings located in a high-wealth area are more
likely to afford the cost of green building certification. As described in Section 2, the econometric
models are at the zip code level. The only publically-available zip code-level economic data is the total
number of establishments (EST) and total annual payroll (AP) of each zip code from the United States
Census Bureau (USCB)’s County Business Patterns (CBP) in 2013. The definition of an establishment is
“a single physical location where business is conducted or where industrial operations are performed
and total annual payroll in a zip code includes all forms of compensation, such as salaries, wages,
commissions, dismissal pay, bonuses, vacation allowances, sick-leave pay, and employee contributions,
to qualified pension plans paid during the year to all employees” [38]. Since there is a high correlation
between EST and AP (correlation coefficient 0.75), we only include EST as a control variable for zip
code-level economic activities in the model.
This paper focuses on two states: New York and Arizona. NY is one of the leading states in terms
of total number of green-certified commercial buildings. AZ is a representative of states that have
relatively smaller total number of green commercial buildings. From the various data sources described
above, we constructed a panel dataset starting from year 1999 to 2012 for Energy Star (For Arizona,
the time span for Energy Star dataset is 2000–2012 because we do not have data for AZ’s Energy Star
commercial buildings prior to 2000) and a panel dataset of 2002–2012 for LEED program. The shorter
time span for the LEED panel dataset is due to its later starting date.
Table 1 lists the summary statistics of the key variables for the year of 2012 for NY and AZ.
The number of zip codes in each state included in the model is less than the actual number of zip
codes because zip codes with no commercial buildings in 2012 are excluded. Figures 1 and 2 show the
geographic distributions of green buildings in NY and AZ, reflecting the existence of green-building
clusters. Clusters of commercial buildings are different from peer effects. To avoid the confusion between
building clusters and peer effects, we conduct zip code-level analysis and the dependent variable is
the share of commercial buildings in a zip code that were previously non-green buildings and applied
for a green certificate in year t. In addition Figures 1 and 2 potentially reflect the existence of spatial
correlation. Our finding of peer effects can be one reason for the existence of spatial correlation within a
zip code. Our definition of a peer group is a zip code. One limitation of this definition is that we do not
estimate the peer effects among adjacent buildings that are located in two separate zip codes.
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Table 1. New York and Arizona zip code level summary statistics.
NY
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of LEED buildings a 509 0.77 1.97 0 16
Share of LEED buildings b 509 0.03 0.15 0 1
Number of Energy Star buildings 509 1.16 2.43 0 25
Share of Energy Star buildings 509 0.04 0.31 0 1
Number of establishments 509 650.21 906.15 3 7241
Mean year built 509 1952.42 18.30 1874 2002
Mean sqft per building 509 65,113.42 268,980.20 960 2,812,739
Mean per sqft assessed property value 509 99.94 182.75 1 2623
AZ
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of LEED buildings 172 1.02 1.70 0 12
Share of LEED buildings 172 0.03 0.13 0 1
Number of Energy Star buildings 172 2.30 3.04 0 22
Share of Energy Star buildings 172 0.04 0.18 0 1
Number of establishments 172 640.57 526.85 2 2917
Mean year built 172 1985.08 12.97 1936 2007
Mean sqft per building 172 25,137.97 60,146.95 700 662,020
Mean per sqft assessed property value 172 19.69 9.07 3 73
Note: a Here the number of LEED buildings is the sum of LEED buildings in a year; b Based on the data provider
ProspectNow, it tries to cover the entire market, but there is possibility that some buildings are missing in
the database. As a result, there are some zip codes where the ratio of green buildings over all buildings are
over-estimated and even equal to one. Nonetheless, this would not pose any threat to our estimation of peer
effects because we use zip code fixed effects in the models which essentially compare buildings in the same zip
code over time and can control for the inaccuracy of the total number of commercial buildings in the zip code.
3. Results
Tables 2 and 3 report the estimation results of first differences models (FD) and first differences
model with mean-differenced zip code fixed effects (FD_MD). Due to data availability, Xzt is
cross-sectional and does not vary over time so, to be more accurate, Xzt should be Xz in Equations (4)–(6).
As a result the coefficients of Xz will be omitted using fixed effects regressions. In order to test the
influence of Xz, we also ran a random effects model, including generalized least square random effects
(RE GLS) and maximum likelihood random effects (ML RE), as well as a between effects (BE) model.
Due to their more stringent assumptions, results of the random effects and between effects models
are listed in Appendix A and the main discussion of the results are focused on the FD and FD_MD
models. The standard errors are clustered at the zip code level. Table 2 lists the results for NY and
Table 3 lists those for AZ. Models 1–4 and Models 7–10 examine LEED certification while Models 5–6
and Models 11–12 examine Energy Star certification. In Tables 2–5, the unit of β, the coefficient of the
sum of green-certified buildings, is share/count. For example, if β = 0.0350, it means if there is one
more number of green certified building in the zip code, the share of buildings that applied for green
certification in year t will increase by 3.5 percentage points. In Table 6, the unit of β is one. For example,
if β = 0.781, it means that if the share of number of green certified building in the zip code increases by
10 percentage points, the share of buildings that applied for green certification in year t will increase
by 7.81 percentage points. For Table 7, β = 1.028 means that if the share of green certified building in
the zip code increases by 10%, the share of buildings that applied for green certification in year t will
increase by 10.28%.
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Table 2. New York: FE_MD and FD models.
LEED Energy Star
Model Number (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation Method FD_MD 1 FD 2 FD_MD FD FD_MD FD
Sum # of
green buildings
0.0350 *** 0.0271 *** 0.0610 *** 0.0547 *** 0.0182 *** 0.0149 ***
(0.00984) (0.00851) (0.0201) (0.0196) (0.00438) (0.00374)
Change in 2009* Sum #
of green buildings
´0.0273 ** ´0.0285 *
(0.0151) (0.0152)
N 5090 5090 5090 5090 6614 6614
R square (overall) 0.2581 0.2597 0.3081 0.3124 0.1218 0.1412
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01; 1 FD_MD is the first differences model
with mean-differenced zip code fixed effects; 2 FD is the first differences model.
Table 3. Arizona: FE_MD and FD models.
LEED Energy Star
Model Number (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Estimation Method FD_MD 1 FD 2 FD_MD FD FD_MD FD
Sum # of
green buildings
0.0356 *** 0.0296 *** 0.0388 *** 0.0341 *** 0.0212 ** 0.0176 **
(0.0102) (0.00866) (0.0115) (0.0103) (0.00960) (0.00844)
Change in 2009* Sum #
of green buildings
´0.00341 ´0.00472
(0.00637) (0.00657)
N 1720 1720 1720 1720 2064 2064
R-square (overall) 0.3168 0.3182 0.3203 0.3225 0.2434 0.2451
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01; 1 FD_MD is the first differences model
with mean-differenced zip code fixed effects; 2 FD is the first differences model.
Table 4. New York: FE_MD and FD models, office buildings only.
LEED Energy Star
Estimation Method FD_MD 1 FD 2 FD_MD FD FD_MD FD
Sum # of green
office buildings
0.0513 *** 0.0418 *** 0.0784 *** 0.0718 *** 0.0262 *** 0.0226 ***
(0.0147) (0.0138) (0.0256) (0.0254) (0.00556) (0.00495)
Change in 2009* Sum #
of green office buildings
´0.0295 ´0.0319
(0.0198) (0.0197)
N 4820 4820 4820 4820 6264 6264
R-square (overall) 0.3886 0.3894 0.4361 0.4392 0.1997 0.2001
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01; 1 FD_MD is the first differences model
with mean-differenced zip code fixed effects; 2 FD is the first differences model.
Table 5. Arizona: FE_MD and FD models, office buildings only.
LEED Energy Star
Estimation Method FD_MD 1 FD 2 FD_MD FD FD_MD FD
Sum # of green
office buildings
0.0411 *** 0.0358 *** 0.0471 *** 0.0423 *** 0.0225 ** 0.0201 **
(0.0101) (0.00834) (0.0136) (0.0121) (0.00913) (0.00831)
Change in 2009* Sum #
of green office buildings
´0.00331 ´0.00461
(0.00643) (0.00675)
N 1560 1560 1560 1560 1872 1872
R-square (overall) 0.4757 0.4757 0.4888 0.4890 0.3702 0.3702
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01; 1 FD_MD is the first differences model
with mean-differenced zip code fixed effects; 2 FD is the first differences model.
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Table 6. Robustness check I: Using share of green buildings to measure peer effects.
NY LEED NY Energy Star AZ LEED AZ Energy Star
Model Number (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Estimation
method FD_MD
1 FD 2 FD_MD FD FD_MD FD FD_MD FD
Share of
green buildings
0.781 *** 0.781 *** 1.086 *** 1.086 *** 1.063 *** 0.895 *** 0.895 *** 0.846 ***
(0.142) (0.0124) (0.00225) (0.0128) (0.0736) (0.0142) (0.0786) (0.105)
N 5090 5090 6614 6614 1720 1720 2064 2064
R-square (overall) 0.4283 0.4284 0.5042 0.5043 0.4326 0.4328 0.6569 0.6569
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01; 1 FD_MD is the first differences model
with mean-differenced zip code fixed effects; 2 FD is the first differences model.
Table 7. Robustness check II: Models with log ratio as the dependent variable.
Dependent Variable: log(Yzt)
NY LEED NY Energy Star AZ LEED AZ Energy Star
Model Number (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28)
Estimation
method FD_MD
1 FD 2 FD_MD FD FD_MD FD FD_MD FD
log(Sum # of
green buildings)
1.028 *** 0.976 *** 1.013 ** 0.979 ** 1.038 *** 0.997 *** 0.988 *** 0.975 ***
(0.00551) (0.00408) (0.00461) (0.00419) (0.00778) (0.00769) (0.00934) (0.00840)
N 5090 5090 6614 6614 1720 1720 2064 2064
R-square (overall) 0.4283 0.4284 0.5042 0.5043 0.4326 0.4328 0.6569 0.6569
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01; 1 FD_MD is the first differences model
with mean-differenced zip code fixed effects; 2 FD is the first differences model.
The coefficients on the sum of green buildings in Equations (4)–(6) measure the peer effects.
If these coefficients are positive and statistically significant, then peer effects likely exist in the decisions
of commercial buildings to obtain green certificates. Tables 2 and 3 show that these coefficients are
all significantly positive, which imply that peer effects indeed influence firms’ decisions on green
building certification and the results are robust to different estimation methods. Models 1 and 2 in
Table 3 show that the coefficients of existing number of LEED buildings in NY range from 0.03 to 0.04,
indicating that every additional LEED building would increase the share of annual LEED applications
or the probability of a commercial building applying for a LEED certificate by 3 to 4 percentage points.
Similarly, Models 5 and 6 in Table 2 imply that an additional Energy Star certificate would increase the
probability of a commercial building in the same zip code applying for an Energy Star certificate in NY
by about 1–2 percentage points. Models 7 and 8 in Table 3 imply that an additional LEED certificate
would increase the probability of a commercial building in the same zip code applying for a LEED
certificate in AZ by 3–4 percentage points; Models 11 and 12 imply that an additional Energy Star
certificate would increase the probability of a commercial building in the same zip code applying for
an Energy Star certificate in AZ by about two percentage points.
Models 3–4 and 9–10 report the regression estimation results of Equation (6) that measures
whether the change in the LEED rating systems in 2009 had an influence on peer effects. As discussed
in Section 2, the change or upgrade of the LEED rating systems in 2009 could have two opposite
impacts on peer effects because on the one hand the premium enjoyed by LEED certificates obtained
after 2009 could be higher while, on the other hand, greater difficulty (and, hence, cost) to certification
can discourage potential applicants. In Models 3–4 and 9–10, the coefficients for the sum of LEED
green buildings remain significantly positive and are stable across most specifications. The coefficients
for the interaction term between the dummy variable of changing rating system in 2009 and sum of
LEED green buildings are negative, suggesting that the impact of peer effects on the share of annual
green building applications have decreased after changes to the rating system in 2009. The new
rating system operates a stricter application process, thus making certification harder and more
costly. Not surprisingly, firms make trade-offs between the benefits and costs of green certificates.
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According to Kahn et al. [3], energy conservation from environmental friendly technological progress
may be offset by the behavior response of commercial building occupants, which adds to the
uncertainty of the benefit from green certificates. It is also possible that firms learn about the higher
cost of post-2009 certification via peer effects as well. As a result, after 2009, impacts of peer effects on
certification have been reduced.
We also run the models using office buildings only. The results are listed in Tables 4 and 5.
The results show that there are also statistically significant peer effects among office buildings and the
magnitude is similar to that of the models using all building classes.
Appendix A shows the results of random effects and between effects model. The coefficients of
average square footage per building are all significantly positive, indicating that the share of annual
green building applications will go up as building size increases. The coefficients of total number of
establishments are negative and statistically significant. An establishment is a separate business unit
with a single physical location, for example, a manufacturing plant or a store. Within a zip code, if there
are more factories and stores around, it is likely that the area already has a higher density of buildings
so that fewer new green buildings would have been constructed. Compared with existing non-green
buildings, new constructions are more likely to obtain green certificates because it is more costly
and time consuming to retrofit an existing non-green building in order to make it green. Therefore,
the share of annual green building applications would be lower in these areas with more business units.
4. Robustness Checks
4.1. Using Share of Green Buildings to Measure Peer Effects
As a robustness check, instead of using the sum of green buildings as the explanatory variable
to estimate peer effects, we use the share of all green buildings to measure peer effects. Specifically,
we estimate the following equation:
Yzt “ α ` βpzt ` γ1Xzt ` hz ` xt ` ezt (7)
where pzt in Equation (7) is the share of all green buildings in year t calculated by dividing the sum of
green buildings in year t by the total number of commercial buildings in year t in a zip code.
4.2. Using Log Share of Newly-Installed Green Buildings as the Dependent Variable
The second robustness check uses the log of the share of newly installed green buildings as
the dependent variable, which measures the percentage change of the share in response to the
installed base:
logpYztq “ α ` βlogpbztq ` γ1Xzt ` hz ` xt ` ezt (8)
Table 6 lists the results from estimating Equation (7) and Table 7 lists the results from estimating
Equation (8). The coefficients for the installed base variables are still significantly positive for most
model specifications. Thus, our results are robust to different forms of the explanatory variable that
measures peer effects and different forms of the dependent variables. Since our main regression is
estimated appropriately, our discussion in this paper is based on the results of the main regression only.
5. Discussion
After correcting for self-selection and reflection problems, existence of causal peer effects on
whether to apply for green certification is demonstrated by empirical evidence. As discussed earlier,
peer effects could be a possible driver of applying for green building certificates through the following
mechanisms: (1) peers’ decisions to get certified can reduce the perceived risk on economic returns;
(2) peers getting green can impose a new norm in a neighborhood and, thus, buildings feel the
pressure to conform; (3) green building knowledge spillovers such as how to apply for a green building
certificate and where to find experts on relevant technologies; (4) increased competition in the rental
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markets or other business environment due to green certification; and (5) there is empirical evidence
showing that when in peer groups, agents are more willing to take risks [39]. Future empirical research
is needed to identify these mechanisms and differentiate among them.
The empirical evidence of peer effects presented in this paper does have at least one caveat, and
that is the fact that the empirical models utilized in this study do not include the monetary costs
(either direct or shadow) associated with obtaining green certification. Given that it is possible that the
cumulative adoption level is correlated with these costs, and buildings within the same neighborhood
probably face similar costs for green certification, omitting such costs might induce an overestimation
of peer-effects. While acknowledging this as a potential drawback to the findings, it should also
be noted that certification costs, assuming that buildings in a neighborhood face similar costs, can
be viewed as another unobservable character faced by all buildings. Additionally, as discussed in
Section 2.1, this paper also adopts a common approach to eliminate unobservable characteristics by
including fixed effects in the panel analysis. Hence, although such a method is not perfect, the omission
of certification costs might not be as severe a drawback as it first appears.
The implication of the existence of peer effects for policy makers is that, in order to promote
the diffusion of green buildings effectively, establishing early adopters or demonstration projects is
important, because these early adopters can pressure their peers to follow the trend. Bollinger [40]
shows that demonstration sites have positive effects on the adoption of green technologies. Through
various policy instruments such as tax credits, early adopters of green certificates can be established.
As peer effects take hold, government can gradually phase out or reduce subsidies, while the number
of adopters of green buildings can still increase. The implication for green-building-related business or
professionals is the following: when marketing to commercial buildings and business owners about
obtaining green certificates, emphasizing peers’ choice is important in the communication. Another
implication for both policy-makers and industry is that hosting any information provision programs,
such as green-building-related industry meetings, will help increase the word-of-mouth impact among
building decision-makers, an important channel for peer effects to take place, which ultimately can
increase the adopters of green certificates.
6. Conclusions
This paper adds to the existing literature by examining peer effects in the adoption of green
certificates by commercial buildings. This paper exploits a rich panel dataset and the fact that there is
a lag between the application submission and approval to correct for the self-selection and reflection
issues often present in the identification of causal peer effects. Empirical results show that an additional
approved LEED certificate within a zip code will increase the probability of a commercial building in
the same zip code to apply for a LEED certificate by 3–4 percentage points in NY and AZ; an additional
approved Energy Star certificate within a zip code will increase the probability of a commercial
building in the same zip code to apply for an Energy Star certificate by 1–2 percentage points in NY
and AZ. In addition, the magnitude of peer effects decreases after 2009 when LEED systems started to
impose more stringent standards, suggesting that perhaps through communication with their peers,
commercial buildings learned that it has become more difficult and costly to obtain LEED certification
after the change in 2009. Given that NY is one of the largest states in terms of commercial buildings
(both in types and in quantity) and that AZ’s unique weather pattern increases the potential benefits of
green certification, empirical results from this study are highly relevant given that it focuses on the
two states that are more likely to be impacted by green-certification diffusion. That said, generalizing
the results to states dissimilar to NY and AZ should always be performed with caution.
The magnitude of the peer effects found in this study is relatively significant in the diffusion given
that the base share of green buildings is low. This study only shows that there is empirical evidence
confirming the existence of peer effects among commercial building decision-makers when it comes
to green-certifications, but the evidence does not reveal the exact mechanism via which peer effects
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come into existence, thus limiting our ability to make policy recommendations to enhance peer effects.
Such questions are reserved for future research.
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Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
LEED Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
USGBC U.S. Green Building Council
FD First differences
FD_MD Mean-differenced zip code fixed effects
GIS Geographic Information Systems
RE GLS Generalized least square random effects
ML RE Maximum likelihood random effects
BE Between effects
Appendix A. Random Effects and Between Effects Models
Table A1. New York: Random effects and between effects models.
LEED Energy Star
Estimation
Method RE GLS
1 BE 2 ML RE 3 RE GLS BE ML RE
Sum # of
green buildings
0.00910 *** 0.0149 *** 0.00910 *** 0.00174 *** 0.00151 ** 0.00174 ***
(0.00101) (0.00287) (0.00101) (0.000454) (0.000684) (0.000454)
Total number of
establishments
´0.00000493 *** ´0.00000723 *** ´0.00000493 *** ´0.00000183 *** ´0.00000172 *** ´0.00000183 ***
(0.00000133) (0.00000171) (0.00000133) (0.000000577) (0.000000563) (0.000000576)
Average year built 0.0000499 0.0000439 0.0000499 ´0.0000472 * ´0.0000466 * ´0.0000472 *
(0.0000642) (0.0000642) (0.0000640) (0.0000273) (0.0000240) (0.0000273)
Average sqft
per building
3.87 ˆ 10´8 *** 3.76 ˆ 10´8 *** 3.87 ˆ 10´8 *** 1.85 ˆ 10´8 *** 1.86 ˆ 10´8 *** 1.85 ˆ 10´8 ***
(4.23 ˆ 10´9) (4.25 ˆ 10´9) (4.22 ˆ 10´9) (1.79 ˆ 10´9) (1.57 ˆ 10´9) (1.79 ˆ 10´9)
Average assessed
value per sqft
0.000000124 ´0.000000637 0.000000123 0.000000466 0.000000446 0.000000466
(0.00000633) (0.00000634) (0.00000632) (0.00000269) (0.00000235) (0.00000269)
N 5599 5599 5599 7123 7123 7123
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 1 RE_GLS is the generalized least
square random effects model. 2 BE is the between effects model. 3 ML RE is the maximum likelihood random
effects model.
Table A2. Arizona: Random effects and between effects models.
LEED Energy Star
Estimation
Method RE GLS
1 BE 2 ML RE 3 RE GLS BE ML RE
Sum # of
green buildings
0.00907 *** 0.00790 *** 0.00906 *** 0.00400 *** 0.00107 0.00400 ***
(0.000877) (0.00160) (0.000871) (0.000618) (0.000904) (0.000615)
Total number of
establishments
´0.00000412 *** ´0.00000375 ** ´0.00000412 *** ´0.00000842 *** ´0.00000555 *** ´0.00000842 ***
(0.00000158) (0.00000163) (0.00000155) (0.00000183) (0.00000177) (0.00000182)
Average year built 0.0000814 0.0000732 0.0000813 ´0.0000984 ´0.000129 ** ´0.0000984
(0.0000645) (0.0000652) (0.0000635) (0.0000717) (0.0000640) (0.0000714)
Average sqft
per building
9.98 ˆ 10´8 *** 0.000000103 *** 9.99 ˆ 10´8 *** 0.000000177 *** 0.000000182 *** 0.000000177 ***
(1.40 ˆ 10´8) (1.44 ˆ 10´8) (1.37 ˆ 10´8) (1.53 ˆ 10´8) (1.37 ˆ 10´8) (1.53 ˆ 10´8)
Average assessed
value per sqft
´0.000231 ** ´0.000229 ** ´0.000231 *** ´0.0000667 ´0.0000630 ´0.0000667
(0.0000907) (0.0000908) (0.0000893) (0.000101) (0.0000894) (0.000100)
N 1892 1892 1892 2236 2236 2236
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 1 RE_GLS is the generalized least
square random effects model. 2 BE is the between effects model. 3 ML RE is the maximum likelihood random
effects model.
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